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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GLADYS F. LUNDBERG, \Vidow
and RICHARD F. LUNDBERG,
J ER 0 L D NEAL LUNDBERG,
PA ULEEN LUNDBERG and DAVID WiLSON LUNDBERG, minor
dependent children of LEO LATHl::"J;l
LUNDBERG, Deceased,
Plaintiffs,

vs.

Case No.
11663

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH, CREAM O'\VEBER/FEDERATED DAIRY FARMS, INC.,
and LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMP ANY,
Defendants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is a claim against the defendant Cream O'\Veber Dairy/Federated Dairy Farms, Inc., and its insurer, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, under the
1

Workmen's Compensation Laws of the State of UtatII,
for payment of death benefits to the appellants as a result of the death of Leo L. Lundberg.
DISPOSITION BELOW
A
was held before Robert J. Shaughnessy, Hearing Examiner for the Industrial Commission
of Utah, after which an Order was entered denying the
claim of the applicants on the ground that the deceased
Leo L. Lundberg "was not at the time in the course o!,
nor did the accident arise out of his employment." Appellants filed a Motion for Review which was granted.
Subsequent to said review, the Examiner entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment
'that Leo L. Lundberg at the time of his death was not
in the course of his employment nor did his death arise
out of his employment inasmuch as his vehicle was not
required .(company cars being available), and did not
serve a substantial function in the company's business.
Appellants thereafter filed a Motion for Review by the
entire Commission, which Motion was denied, and the
present appeal was initiated.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Appellants seek to have the Court hold as a matter
of law that the deceased Leo L. Lundberg was at the
time of his death, acting within the scope and the course
of his employment and/or that his death arose out of
2

his employment, and order the Industrial Commission
to enter appropriate Orders entitling the appellants to
death benefits provided by law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are essentially uncontroverted. The deceased Leo L. Lundberg was killed August 31, 1965 in
a car-train collision at Second 'iVest and 3900 South
'
Salt Lake City, Utah, at approximately 7 :30 o'clock
a.m.; at his death, he was the husband of the appellant
Gladys F. Lundberg, and the father of four minor children, Richard F. Lundberg, age 17; Jerold Neal Lundberg, age 14; Pauleen Lundberg, age 11; and David
Wilson Lundberg, age 5 (R-73). The deceased was employed as a wholesale sales manager for Cream O'W eber
Dairy and had been employed with the dairy for approximately thirty years in various positions. As wholesale sales manager, he was paid $1,000.00 per month and
had general responsibilities for the wholesale sales operation (R-111). His duties were many: Supervising
the wholesale deliverymen and their supervisors, calling
on the restaurants, cafes, stores, and other outlets promoting new sales and protecting existing sales by assisting in promotions, pricing and spacing, and by socially
entertaining the owners and executives of his customers
(R-34, 78, 111, 124).
In addition to his regular duties, he would often
receive phone calls from customers at night and on
weekends and it would be his responsibility to satisfy

3

the particular problem as soon as practical (R-119, 121),
He also delivered dairy products in his car to customers
on occasion, such as holidays and weekends when the
regular deliverymen were not available (R-81).
To facilitate the successful execution of these
duties, the company provided to the deceased a membership to Willow Creek Country Club and the Towne
House Club, paying his monthly dues and paying that
portion of the expenses incurred as a result of business
entertainment (R-166, 152). The purpose of these clubs
was to entertain customers and were used during business hours, at night, and on weekends, whenever socializing the customer could be accomplished. The extent of
his socializing on company business is shown by the expense vouchers attached to the record, which average
out at about $85.00 every two weeks.

1

The deceased was also an active participant in the
Grocers' Association where he acted as Golf Tournament Chairman (R-22) and frequently played golf
with his customers at Willow Creek Country Club.
Having been blessed with a magnetic personality and '
gregarious nature, he was particular adept at cultivating the friendships and favor of his customers (R-184).
He was so effective in his job that one customer ref erred to him as "Mr. Cottonwood Dairy" (R-132).
1

Essential to his duties was the use of an automobile,
inasmuch as approximately 50'1° of his work was away
from the company offices ( R-47, 162) and often in·
volved transporting to grand openings and other pro·
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motion events, dairy employees, dairy products, promotion supplies and equipment, and transporting customers for business and social purposes ( R-77) . On occasions he would be transporting large items such as
posters and other paraphernalia us.ed in the promotions
and grand openings (R-105). The company required
him to use an automobile in his duties, either his own or
' one of the company automobiles (R-155, 187). It mattered not to the company what car was used, in fact the
('Ompany never requested him to use the company ve, hicles ( R-164), but merely advised him that they were
available for his use. The company had a panel truck
and two Volkswagens stationed at the plant for use by
the deceased and other supervisory employees during
business hours (R-156); however, these automobiles
were unavailable on weekends or after hours, and inasmuch as they were subject to use by other supervisory
employees (R-187), it may be inferred that on occasions
they may not be available to deceased.
1

The deceased rarely used the company vehicles ( R-

28), preferring to use his own nine-passenger station-

wagon, it being more spacious and apparently, in his
opinion, better suited for his duties ( R-183). The company policy regarding the employees' use of their own
, vehicles was set up to comply with the auditing requirements of the Internal Revenue Service ( R-164), and
thus eight cents per mile was paid for mileage incurred
during business hours (R-47), but excluded mileage
from home to the off ice or the first stop, and from the
last stop or the office to home at night, and also excluded
1
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mileage incurred after hours for business entertainment
and other business purposes ( R-148) . The companv
provided an expense account to the deceased which
or)\ed entertainment expenses incurred at any time,
night or day (R-152, 153). Thus, the mileage policy was
more restrictive than the expense account in order to
comply with the Internal Revenue Service ( R-148,
164).

The deceased owned two vehicles, however, he kept
his stationwagon available for company business at night
and on weekends (R-79). He rarely let his family use
it, explaining to them that he might need it for a customer ( R-79) .
On the day of his death, he had previously scheduled an 8 o'clock a.m., breakfast appointment with a
customer (R-137); however, a meeting with his wholesale routemen concerning wages and route changes required him to reschedule the breakfast appointment for
10 o'clock a.m., that same day. The meeting with the
routemen was to be at 8 o'clock a.m., at the company
office at 2500 South Second West. He left his house
earlier than usual that morning and was on a route not
usually taken by him to the office (R-101). He normally would take a route along State Street to 2735 South
and then turn west to the dairy (R-101). On the day of
his death, he was driving his stationwagon and proceeding north on Second West and while crossing the railroad tracks at 3900 South, he was.s.truck by a train and
killed.
6

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COMMISSION ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN CONCLUDING THAT DECEASED'S DEATH DID NOT ARISE OUT
OF HIS EMPLOYMENT OR WITHIN THE
COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT.
The sole issue herein is whether or not the death of
Leo L. Lundberg occurred in the course of, or arising
from, his employment, which issue this Court has held
to be a question of law and the conclusion of which, by
the Industrial Commission, is not binding on this Court.
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company v. Industrial
Conirnission, 100 Utah 8, no P.2d 334, (1941). This
Court is well acquainted with the "Going and Coming
Doctrine" which is an accepted doctrine excluding
Workmen's Compensation Coverage to an employee
traveling to and from his home to his place of employment. This doctrine, however, has been circumscribed
with several exceptions, See Vitagraph, Inc., v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 96 U 190, 85 P.2d 601
(1931). This Court in two recent cases considered and
rejected application of the "Going and Coming Doctrine" and instead applied the so-called "Instrumentality and Substantial Service" exception. In Bailey v.
Utah State Industrial Commission, 16 Utah 2d 208,
398 P.2d 545 ( 1965), the deceased was the owner of a
service station, but under Utah Law was treated as an
employee of the business. He was killed while driving
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his stationwagon to the business from his home. lu <li;cussing the role of the stationwagou, the Court said:
"It is undisputed that the stationwagon involved was used by the deceased in his busiuess
and somewhat necessary thereto. He used it fo;.
emergency calls at all hours, carried in it some
necessary tools and implements to service or repair customer's automobiles and permitted customers to use it while their car was being serviced at his station .... " (Supra, page 546).

The Court concluded after discussing the case of Davis
v. Bjorenson, 293 N.W. 829, Iowa (1940), that the stationwagon was an instrumentality of the business an<l
that it was an element of the deceased's duties to takf'
the vehicle to the station in the morning for its use in
the business, and in so providing the vehicle, he was performing a substantial .service required by the business.
Likewise, in the Davis case, an employee of the
service station, as part of his duties, provided his vehicle
for outside service calls and other work, and in addition,
was required to use the vehicle for emergency calls after
hours. He was injured while driving the vehicle to the
station one morning. The award to applicant was af·
firmed.
This Court in discussing Davis, deemed as the im·
portant elements: The instrumentality of the car in the
business at all hours of the day and night, that it was the
employee's duty to have a vehicle in the execution of his
duties, and in so providing his vehicle, he was perform-
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ing a substantial service required by his employer. Using

similar elements and reasoning, this Court concluded
that Bailey was acting in the course of his employment,
and the denial of an award by the Industrial Commission was reversed.
Subsequent to the Bailey case, this court decided
the case of G. B. Moser v. Industrial Commission of
Utah, et al., 21 U.2d 51, 440 P.2d 51 ( 1968), wherein
the claimant was injured while trying to start a trucktractor which was a leased vehicle under the control of
his employer. Employee was a truck driver and worked
when a trip was available. He was allowed to drive the
truck-tractor to his home and back. The Court, in concluding that the injuries sustained were in the course of
his employment, again applied the Bailey test; i.e., was
the vehicle committed to use as an instrumentality within the employer's business and did it serve a substantial
fuction in that business. If so, efforts to make it available to the employer were within the scope of the employment. The Court specifically noted the fact that the
employee derived benefit for himself; i.e., transportation to his employment, however, such dual purpose did
not negate application of the exception.
The appellant submits that the Bailey and Moser
cases properly confine their inquiry to whether the
duties of the employee required the use of an automobile
as an instrumentality to perform a substantial function
in the business. There is no dispute that such is true in
the present case. The problem arises from the Commis-

9

sion's misconstruction of Bailey and JJ-loser and the '·Iustrumentality and Substantial Service Exception."

A cursory examination of the Findings of Fact
show that the Commission erred in its final formulation
of the test. On the second page of the .Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law (R-232), the Commission eoucludes from the Bailey case a necessity that the employer
require the employee to bring his vehicle for use during
business hours; and in regards to ]}f oser, the Commission properly restated the requirement therein, that the
vehicle be a tool or instrumentality in the employers
business, which in order to continue its function must
have been driven to the employer's terminal. However,
the Commi.ssion then summarily concludes such is not
the case here. On the third page of the Findings of Fad
and Conclusions of Law (R-233), the Commission formulates the exception requirement as being "the burde11
is on the employee to establish the requirement of the
car being on the job to be used during working hours."
From these inconsistent bases, the Commission concluded that the "Going and Coming Doctrine" applied.
Appellant submits that the Industrial Commission
has completely misconstrued and misapplied the Bai/elf
and ]}f oser cases. The essential points in both cases are
present in this case: The vehicle was committed to use
as an instrument in carrying out the deceased's required
du
by deceased' s permissible election as to which ve·
hicle he used; that the use of said vehicle was clearly a
substantial function of employer's business; and that
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Lundberg's driving said vehicle from home to work, admitledly a <lual purpose, arose out of his employment,
ur was in the course of said employment. To apply the
rationale of the Industrial Commission would lead to a
logical absurdity; that is, where an employee is required
lo use a vehicle in executing his duties, however, because
he is a trusted and valuable employee it is left to his disl'rdion and judgment as to what vehicle he uses, and
there being no requirement as to any specific vehicle
Gtiug used, he would not be within his employment in
dridng it from home to work. Thus, under the Commission's rationale, even had Lundberg been driviug a
t:om1,a11y vehicle from his home to his office the morning
ht was killed, he would not have been within his employment, because that vehicle was not specifically re11uired.

Surely, Lundberg is not to be treated differently
from Mcser and Bailey merely because his employer,
as an expression of confidence gave him discretion as to
11 hat vehicle he used in his required duties. It is clear
from the facts that Lundberg made an election as to
ll'hich vehicle he felt was best suited for the carrying out
of hi:: numerous duties and had, in fact, committed his
, rehicle as an instrumentality performing a substantial
function in his employer's business.
Cases from other jurisdictions clearly sustain the
position above elucidated. A case directly in point is that
of Ki11.<J v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 315
P.2d H8, Ore., ( 1957). There, the deceased employee,
11

King, was employed in the construction of a floating log
boom, on a large body of water. His employer, who had
no contractual obligation to provide transportation to
the place of employment, had, nevertheless, made available a company-owned boat for use of the employees in
transporting themselves to the place of employment and
then for use in their duties of constructing the log boom.
On the day that King was killed, he had elected to take
his own boat, which he had done on other occasions, and
to use the same in performing his duties on the boom
construction site. His employer did not pay him for expenses incurred in driving his boat to the place of employment. The lower court affirmed the State Industrial
Accident Commission's denial of compensation to King's
widow, holding that the accident did not arise out of, or
in the course, of his employment. The appellate court
reversed that conclusion and held, as a matter of law,
that under the facts, King was acting within the course
of his employment. In doing so, the Court relied upon
the following elements:
I. A boat was essential to King's duties at the con·

struction site.
2. That King had used his own boat on the day of

the accident because he felt it was better suited for the
job to be done that day.

3. That the boat served a dual purpose, that is, in

providing transportation of King to the work site, and
as an instrumentality in the performance of his duties
thereat.

12

1

The Court then made a scholarly study of cases
a1Hl other works relating to exception to the "Going
anJ Coming Doctrine" and concluded:
. "\Ve conclude that the act of King in bringmg the boat across the bay served the interests of
the employers and was of direct benefit to them .
. . . " (Supra, page 155).

The Court treated the boat as a vehicle and as an essentiai tool or instrument of King's employment, and the
fact that the employer had a boat available was of J?.O
consequence. In fact, it appears there, as in the present
case, that the employee, in using his own vehicle, was
emcising discretion permitted by the employer to make
possible completion of his duties in a more satisfactory
and efficient manner.
The Oregon Court also referred to the Davis v.
Hjorenson case, and as in the Bailey case, directed its
attention to the fact that the vehicle constituted an in, strumentality performing a substantial service for the
I employer. The Oregon Court also discussed a Texas
I C"ase directly in point: Jones v. Texas Indemnity Insurance Company, Tex. Civ. App., 223 S.W.2d 286
11961) .Here, the employee was a serviceman for ahouse1 hold equipment company. His duties required the use of
1
1,111 automobile during business hours and also for emergency calls after hours. He was paid five cents per mile
\ for mileage incurred on the company business. The em\ ployee was injured driving from his home to the store
one morning. The Court held that the use of the auto-
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mobile served a substantial function in his employer's
business, and thus his transferring the automobile to the
place of business was an activity within the course of
his employment.
Other cases to this same effect are: Smith v. Workmen's Compensation Appea/,s Board, 447 P.2d 365, 73
Cal. Rpt. 253 ( 1968) . There, the deceased was a social
worker killed driving his vehicle to work one morning,
The application for death benefits was denied. The
Court reversed that denial. The Court first discussed
the "Going and Coming Rule" and the various exceptions to it; however, it limited its holding to the single
exception of an employee bringing his car to his place of
employment where the vehicle's function is required in ,
the employee's employment. The county had cars available for the use of the social workers, however, the deceased had never availed himself of their use, although
he had discretion in that regard. The California Court
then discussed the prior California case, Postal Telephone Cable Company v. Industrial Accident Commlision, 37 P.2d 441, I Cal. 2d 730 {1934), wherein the
Court had given wide rein to the "Going and Coming
Rule." The Court concluded that the necessity of the
"Going and Coming Rule" had changed with modern
times. The Court made the following statement in rejecting Postal Telegraph:
"Postal Telegraph must be overruled
it does not recognize an important limitatwn
upon the going and coming rule. That limitation
arises from the principle that an employee is per-
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forming service growing out of and incidental to
his employment when he engages in conduct reasonably directed toward the fulfillment of his
employer's requirements, performed for the benefit and advantage of the employer. Suspension
of the employment relation and consequent noncoverage of the employee is incompatible with
performance of service required by the employer.
Hence, the employer's requirement that the
worker furnish a vehicle of transportation on the
job curtails the application of the going and
coming rule." (Supra, page 368-369).

The Court then went on to explain that the requirement
for an automobile did not have to be express or even implied in the employment contract, but was required in
this context if an automobile was required in the performance of the employee's duties, and thus driving a
rehicle to work to perform those duties was inferred.
The California Court also directed itself to the old
Utah cases of Denver-Rio Grande Western Railway
Company v. Industrial Commission, 72 Utah 199, 269
P 512 ( 1928), and Fidelity and Casualty Company v.
Industrial Commission of Utah, 79 U 189, 8 P.2d 617
(1932), which cases had been previously cited in the
Postal Telegraph case. The Court distinguished the
Denver case on its facts, and in regard to Fidelity Casualty noted that it had been rejected and overturned by
this Court's Bailey decision.
The Court then concludes :
"We conclude that the decisional basis of
Postal Telegraph has been eroded, that the case
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..not represent the trend of authority, and
that it must be overruled. Surely, in this day ·of
a highly motorized society, we cannot case the
going and coming rule as a protective cloak over
the shoulders of the employer, who, for his own
advantage, demands that the employee furnish
the car on the job. Smith's obligation reached out
beyond the employer's premises, in driving his
car to and from there, he did no more than fu].
fill the conditions and requirements of his employment." (Supra, page 373).

"Since Postal Telegraph, however, the trend '
has been decidedly in favor of recovery, and Pro·
fessor Larson regards this treatment as the better
rule. 1 The Law of Workmen's Compensation,
Section 17 50.... " (Supra, page 372).
The Court also noted that since Postal Telegraph,
ten cases have arisen in other jurisdictions wherein in·
juries or death were incurred while driving a vehicle re·
quired in the employee's duties, to or from work. Seven
of
ten jurisdictions allowed recovery under the
Workmen's Compensation Laws: State Department o/
Highways v. John, 422 P.2d 855, Alaska, (1967);
Bailey v. Utah State Industrial Commission, 16 U.2d
208, 298 P.2d 545 (1965) Willis v. Cloud, 151 S.2d 369
(La.App.); Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory v. Kiel,
167 N.E.2d 604, Ind.; King v. State Industrial Acci·
dent Commission, 315 P.2d 148, Ore.; Borak v. H. E.
Westerman Lumber Company, 58 N.W.2d 567, Minn.;
Davis v. Bjorenson, 293 N.W. 829, Iowa (1940).

Borak v. H. E. Westerman Lumber Company,

supra, is another case directly in point with the present
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appeal. There Barak was a manager of a lumber yar<l.
1t was his duty to supervise the men at the yard and on
rarious jobs outside the yard, and in addition, made
small deliveries of merchandise and other errands for
his employer. The use of an automobile was expected in
connection with his duties as manager and he was paid
seven cents per mile while using his automobile on company business, except when driving to and from work.
It was also established in that case that Barak used his
car in performing these duties except on occasion when
he would use a company car or truck. The Court concluded that Borak's car was "customarily used" in the
business, which finding the Court held was determinati1e. The facts there showed that Barak had customarily
taken his car to work for the use in his duties as manager. That on the morning of his death, in attempting
to start the car in his garage, he was asphyxiated. The.
employer attempted to distinguish this case from a prior
rase in Minnesota where the car was being prepared for
an immediate outside errand. The Court said in response:
" ... However, that difference in itself is not
sufficient to warrant denying compensation where
there is a reasonable inference that decedent was
trying to start his car in order to take it to his
place of business to be ready for use, if necessary.
Neither can compensation be denied under the
facts and circumstances here because on the particular dav of decendent's death, his work probably would have been confined to work in the
office on invoices, etc. Inasmuch as it had been
his custom for years to have the car at the lumber

17

yard for company use when required." (Supra
page 571).
'

!

Although there are numerous other cases, included
in which are some Utah cases, which talk generally on
the
of vehicles, it appears that the Bailey and Moser
cases represent the present position of the Utah Law in
regards to the facts of this case. A careful reading of the
Bailey and Moser cases, and comparable cases in other
jurisdictions, clearly shows that the Industrial Comrnis·
sion erred in failing to conclude that Lundberg's death
arose out his employment or occurred within the course
of his employment, for it is without serious dispute that
his car was essential to the performance of his numerous
duties as wholesale sales manager; that although a company vehicle may have been available on given days, he
obviously concluded that his was more available and
better suited to performing his duties, which election
was permitted by his employer; and that by driving his
vehicle to work the day he was killed, he was carrying
out a substantial function of his employment, and was
of direct benefit to his employer.

CONCLUSION

The Commission, in denying appellants claim, acted
arbitrarily and contrary to law. To find under the pres· ,
ent facts, as the Commis!'lion did, that the deceased's re·
hicle was not an instrumentality in, and necessary to the
company's business, is clearly unsupportable in fact or
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Jaw. Equally unsupportable in law is the Commission's
demand that the vehicle in which Lundberg was killed
be the required vehicle. Deceased's duties required an
automobile. Clearly, he elected to use his own vehicle in
order to maximize his efficiency and ability in his manyfaceted duties. To now penalize his dependents for serving his employer so well is contrary to the law and the
spirit of Utah \Vorkmen's Compensation.

Respectfully submitted,
Delbert M. Draper, Jr.
W. Brent Wilcox
DRAPER, SANDACK &
SAPERSTEIN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants
606 El Paso Natural Gas Building

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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